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"A FRESH START WITH SOMEONE ELSE'S PROPERTY":'
LIEN AVOIDANCE, THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
AND DIVORCE PROPERTY DIVISIONS
UNDER SECTION 522(f)(1) OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
INTRODUCTION
When marital property is distributed during divorce,2 the family home
is frequently given to one spouse and a money judgment to the other.3
To assure payment by the debtor spouse of the non-debtor's share of the
net marital assets, the state divorce court often places a lien' on the home
retained by the debtor.5 Because of the widespread adoption of equitable
distribution statutes,6 divorce property divisions represent a state court
judgment based on principles of fairness and sharing,* regardless of
whether the parties have consented to a settlement agreement or the
court has imposed its own determination.' When debtors file a petition
for bankruptcy before the lien is satisfied, however, they may seek to
reduce or eliminate a postmarital obligation secured to the former mari-
tal property by using provisions of the Bankruptcy Code9 that are in-
tended to ensure a fresh start for debtors.'°
1. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 608 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350).
2. See infra note 8.
3. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 599; Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F. 2d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir.
1984); see also R. Aaron, Bankruptcy Law Fundamentals § 7.01[3), at 7-12.1 (1990)
("The house is frequently the major asset of the spouses...
4. See infra note 18 (discussing liens and bankruptcy).
5. State divorce laws empower the divorce court to make such property divisions.
See 2 H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 16.1, at 176-77
(1987).
Two essential characteristics in the cases denying avoidance are: (1) the lien imposed
as part of the divorce proceedings is written into the final divorce decree and (2) the lien
is placed on the marital home, not on the debtor's property in general. See Borman v.
Leiker (In re Borman), 886 F.2d 273, 274 (10th Cir. 1989); Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d
1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 1984). The Tenth Circuit avoided a lien in Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d
935 (10th Cir. 1988), holding that the lien was not placed on the marital home and the
property settlement made grant of the property "free and clear" of the non-debtor
spouse's claims. See id. at 939. The court subsequently limited Maus to its facts in
Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259, 263-65 (10th Cir. 1988).
6. See infra note 39.
7. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
8. Divorce property distributions in which liens are enforceable by the court, and are
therefore vulnerable to interpretation as court-obtained liens, are determined either by
the divorce court or by agreement of the parties prior to the court's final judgment grant-
ing the divorce. See infra text accompanying notes 44-45. In this Note, "property settle-
ment" refers to consensual divorce property divisions that have been incorporated into
the final decree.
9. [Bankruptcy Reform] Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)) [hereinafter the Bank-
ruptcy Code or the Code].
10. See infra notes 105-148 and accompanying text (discussing grounds on which
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Under federal bankruptcy law, the debtor is permitted to exempt" a
homestead12 from the reach of creditors.' 3 A homestead is generally real
property that a debtor uses as a residence. "4 The purpose of exemptions
is to allow the debtor to come through bankruptcy with adequate posses-
sions for a fresh start. 5 Section 522(f)(l),16 a new provision of the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act,1 7 specifically gives debtors the right to avoid
certain liens" on exempt property. 9 Debtors have sought to apply the
debtors have attempted to avoid divorce decree homestead liens and citing relevant
cases).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988) (Bankruptcy Code exemption provision). Section 522
applies to individual debtors, see 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988), who most commonly file for
liquidation under Chapter 7 or for readjustment of their debts under Chapter 13. See G.
Treister, J. Trost, L. Forman, K. Klee & R. Levin, Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Law
§ 7.01, at 295 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter G. Treister]; see generally T. Crandall, F.
Hagedorn & F. Smith, Debtor-Creditor Law Manual S 13.07[3], at 13-39 to -41 (1985)
(discussing protection of debtors' exemptions) [hereinafter T. Crandall]; G. Treister,
supra, § 1.04, at 17-19 (describing Code chapters).
12. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
13. The exemptions that are defined in section 522(b) of the Code allow the debtor to
remove certain property from the estate that the trustee brings together in accordance
with section 541 for distribution to the debtor's creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b), 541
(1988). The purpose of exemptions is to protect the debtor's fresh start by leaving the
debtor an amount of real and personal property that is necessary for beginning a new life.
See infra notes 56, 58 and accompanying text.
14. In divorce decree lien avoidance cases, the homestead claimed as exempt by the
debtor had been the spouses' marital home prior to divorce. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In
re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 599-600 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990). In
bankruptcy, after debtors claim their exemption, the property defined in divorce as the
marital home is referred to as the debtor's homestead. See id. at 599.
15. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6318 [hereinafter House Report].
16. Section 522(f)(1) reads: "Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor
may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that
such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled.... if such
lien is- (1) a judicial lien; . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
17. [Bankruptcy Reform] Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). See infra note 166.
18. A lien is one method by which unsecured creditors who have successfully ob-
tained a court judgment seek to enforce that judgment. See T. Crandall, supra note 11,
5.01, at 5-3. Outside of bankruptcy law, a lien is "an interest in the debtor's property that
affords the creditor the legal power to ultimately satisfy the debt from the assets subject
to the lien." Id. The lien is a right created either by agreement or under state law. See
id. 6.05[2][a], at 6-67; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Liens § 6 (1970).
"Lien" is defined in the Code as a "charge against or interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation;..." 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1988). A
lien in bankruptcy is a claim, or right to payment, that is allowed under Section 502 and
secured to property in which the debtor's estate has an interest. See id. §§ 101(4)(A),
502; see also Bowmar, Avoidance of Judicial Liens That Impair Exemptions in Bank-
ruptcy: The Workings of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1), 63 Am. Bankr. L.J. 375, 377-79 (1989)
(describing allowed claims and liens in bankruptcy). On types of liens defined in the
Code, see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(1988). In addition to removing an encumbrance from
the exempt property, avoidance under section 522(f)(1) also reduces the previously se-
cured claim to unsecured debt. See T. Crandall, supra note 11, 13.07[3], at 13-39.
Bankruptcy offers relief to debtors by allowing most of their debts to be discharged,
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avoidance powers of the section to property division divorce decree liens
on their homesteads.2" Because of the complex interrelationship between
bankruptcy and domestic relations laws,2 a debtor spouse may succeed
in avoiding the lien,22 thereby putting the non-debtor spouse on line with
all other unsecured creditors to collect whatever proceeds are available
from the debtor's estate23 and effectively nullifying the divorce property
division.24
The question of whether the lien avoidance provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Code applies to divorce property divisions' is "muddied" 26 by
the variety of theories courts have used to support decisions denying
which leaves unsecured bankruptcy creditors limited to payment out of whatever pro-
ceeds are available from the debtor's estate. See infra note 57 (discussing discharge of
debts). The debtor is relieved of personal liability for the underlying debt. See Bowmar,
supra note 18, at 379. Thus, the result of lien avoidance of dischargeable debts is en-
hancement of both parts of the fresh start policy for individual debtors: exemption of
certain property, which is intended to provide basic necessities for starting anew, and
discharge of debts, which essentially protects the debtor's future earnings from liabilities
the debtor incurred in the past. See T. Crandall, supra note 11, 10.02[2], at 10-3, ¢
13.07[3], at 13-38; see also Cross, The Application of Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code in Cases Involving Multiple Liens, 6 Bankr. Dev. J. 309, 310 (1989) (on usefulness of
section 522(f) to debtors in maximizing exemptions); Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption
Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 769, 769 (1980) ("Permitting
debtors to retain part of their assets while relieving them of all or most of their debts puts
them on the road to a new financial future without the necessity of assistance....").
20. See infra Parts IIA-B and accompanying text. Property distributions that the
debtor may attempt to avoid pursuant to section 522(f)(1) are limited to dischargeable
property debts; exempt property remains liable for debts that are non-dischargeable. See
11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(A)(i) (1988); see also infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text (on
relationship between exempt property, debts and lien avoidance).
21. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir.) (quoting
In re Worth, 100 Bankr. 834, 837 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989)), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 507
(1990) (No. 90-350).
22. See infra Part IIA and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
24. The percentage of the total property division that can be avoided depends largely
upon the debtor's exemption allowance. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
25. Like the lower courts, the four circuit courts that have addressed lien avoidance
in the context of the homestead exemption and divorce property divisions are divided.
See infra notes 105-148 and accompanying text. Split panels of the Seventh Circuit and
the Ninth Circuit have avoided divorce-decree homestead liens. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot
(In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No.
90-350); Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1989). In the
Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, the majority denied lien avoidance in Boyd v. Robin-
son, 741 F.2d 1112, 1115 (8th Cir. 1984). A panel of the Tenth Circuit unanimously
upheld a divorce-decree homestead lien in Borman v. Leiker (In re Borman), 886 F.2d
273, 274 (10th Cir. 1989), citing its reasoning in Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862
F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1988). Although Donahue addressed lien avoidance only in dictum,
the court, in defining an unrecorded divorce decree homestead lien as secured debt, spe-
cifically limited to its facts Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988), a Tenth Circuit
case decided less than a year earlier in which the court granted lien avoidance. See Dona-
hue, 862 F.2d at 264-65; see also infra note 117 (discussing Maus).
26. See In re Rittenhouse, 103 Bankr. 250, 252 (D. Kan. 1989) ("With some trepida-
tion, the court wades into waters muddied before it with little hope of settling anything
but the instant dispute.").
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avoidance27 and by uncertainty about the role of agreement by the parties
in an uncontested divorce.28 Courts have usually focused on issues of
statutory construction and legislative intent, but traditional principles
that have long guided the relationship between federal law and state do-
mestic relations law offer another dimension to the legal and policy ten-
sions addressed in the divorce lien avoidance case law. In large part, the
judicial disagreement about homestead lien avoidance in the divorce set-
ting reflects a conflict between the fresh start policy that is fundamental
to the federal law of bankruptcy2 9 and the equitable goals that are the
foundation of modem divorce statutes.3 °
This Note argues that liens imposed on the marital home by state
courts in divorce decrees should not be subject to the debtor's avoidance
power under the Bankruptcy Code. Part I examines modem divorce law
as it applies to homestead liens and gives a brief history and description
of the lien avoidance provision. Part II analyzes approaches to the lan-
guage of the provision in the context of divorce decree homestead liens.
Part III offers a resolution of the issue based upon statutory construction
of section 522(f)(1) within the framework of the relationship between
domestic relations law and federal law. This Note concludes that Con-
gress and the United States Supreme Court should expressly exclude di-
vorce decree homestead liens from the reach of section 522(f)(1) in order
to correct the imbalance that is created between state divorce law and the
Bankruptcy Code when debtors are permitted to avoid such liens.
I. BACKGROUND
A. State Divorce Law and Property Division Liens
The past twenty years have "witnessed a virtual revolution in matri-
monial law in the United States."'" At the same time that federal bank-
ruptcy law was undergoing major revision, states began to reform their
divorce laws in response to significant changes in American attitudes to-
wards marriage and divorce.32 Some form of no-fault divorce, a ground
for divorce initiated by California in 1970,13 is part of the domestic rela-
27. See infra Part IIB and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 117, 140 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court
has agreed to decide whether a debtor spouse can use section 522(f)(1) unilaterally to
avoid a lien imposed by a state divorce court on the former family home. See Farrey v.
Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990) (No. 90-350).
31. J. Gregory, The Law of Equitable Distribution, at v (1989); see also L. Weitzman,
The Divorce Revolution, at ix (1985) (after California adopted first no-fault divorce law,
"the entire landscape of American family law [was] transformed in a mere decade");
Scheible, Defining "Support" Under Bankruptcy Law: Revitalization of the "Necessaries"
Doctrine, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1988) ("divorce law in the United States has undergone
radical changes in the past few decades").
32. See L. Halem, Divorce Reform 233, 237-38 (1980).
33. Fault-based grounds for divorce were required by every state prior to 1970. See L.
[Vol. 59
1990] BANKRUPTCY AND DIVORCE
tions law of nearly every state today,34 manifesting widespread recogni-
tion that "parties to irretrievably broken marriages are best off ending
such relationships.",31
Divorce laws governing property divisions have also changed drasti-
cally in recent years.3 6 Title-based 37 statutes, under which the court was
not permitted to divide marital property by transferring title from one
spouse to the other,3' have been replaced in almost every state by equita-
ble distribution laws, which do allow such title assignments.39 In imple-
menting the general theory that marriage is a partnership or shared
enterprise and that post-divorce property should be distributed accord-
ingly,' equitable distribution laws4 give the divorce court discretion to
Weitzman, supra note 31, at x. Traditional moral concepts about the nature and perma-
nence of the marital relationship were embodied in statutes requiring that "[o]ne party
had to be judged guilty of some marital fault, such as adultery or cruelty, before a divorce
could be granted." Id. The no-fault laws, first adopted by California in 1970, were the
first significant alteration in divorce codes in the United States in the twentieth century.
See L. Halem, Divorce Reform 233, 238 (1980). The California law recognized "irrecon-
cilable differences" as a legal cause for divorce. See L. Weitzman, supra note 31, at x.
34. State laws vary considerably, some permitting irreconcilable differences without
further limitation as a ground for divorce, while others permit conditional no-fault, such
as a waiting period between separation and divorce. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 4506
(West 1983) (irreconcilable differences or incurable insanity); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170
(McKinney 1988) (living separately and apart for at least one year pursuant to a separa-
tion agreement, or, alternatively, one of five traditional grounds). See generally State Di-
vorce Laws, Fano. L. Rep. (BNA) at 401:001-453:001 (summarizing divorce laws of each
state).
In some states, the misconduct of the parties continues to be one factor in property
division determinations. See J. Gregory, supra note 31, 9.03, at 9-11; 2 H. Clark, supra
note 5, § 16.3, at 194.
35. J. Gregory, supra note 31, at v.
36. See id.
37. See id. 1.01, at 1-1.
38. See Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41
Mo. L. Rev. 165, 167-68 (1976).
39. See J. Gregory, supra note 31, 9 1.06, at 1-16. Mississippi is the only state that
has not clearly adopted the system of permitting divorce courts to divide certain property
owned by the parties at the time of divorce. See id.; Oldham, Tracing Commingling.
and Transmutation, 23 Fam. L.Q. 219, 219 and n.1 (1989). However, the Mississippi
courts do sometimes use their equitable powers to effect a transfer of property. See J.
Gregory, supra note 31, 9 1.06, at 1-19.
40. See J. Gregory, supra note 31, 9 1.02, at 1-5; 2 H. Clark, supra note 5, § 16.3, at
194; see also Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for
Solutions to the Mystery, 23 Fam. L.Q. 253, 256-57 (1989) (the purpose of court-ordered
economic settlement at marriage dissolution is fair sharing so one party "does not suffer
unduly while the other gains because of marriage experience" and to achieve fair sharing
of benefits and burdens of the marriage). Because state statutes vary widely, a universal
definition of equitable distribution that is more specific than the principle of shared enter-
prise is difficult to formulate. See J. Gregory, supra note 31, 9 1.02, at 1-6.
41. Although there are many variations in property division statutes, the states can
generally be divided into two groups: community property states, in which each spouse
has an interest in the assets of the marriage during the marriage, and common-law prop-
erty states, in which each spouse owns the property held in his or her name. See 2 H.
Clark, supra note 5, § 16.1, at 177-78. Almost all of the common-law states have adopted
equitable distribution laws. See supra note 39. In some of the common-law equitable
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assign property.4' When the marital home is the only substantial asset,
the court often divides the net marital assets by giving one spouse the
property and the other a money judgment secured by a lien on the prop-
erty.43 Liens on homestead property that secure a money judgment are
based either on settlements agreed upon by the parties and approved by
the judge' or, in contested divorces, on fact-specific determinations by
state divorce courts.45
Property division has begun to replace alimony as a device for adjust-
ing the financial relationship of the spouses,4 6 partly because women to-
day are more likely to hold jobs outside the home,47 and partly because
property division promotes finality in resolving a divorcing couple's fi-
nancial obligations.48 In encouraging finality, as well as peaceable reso-
distribution states, spouses' property is classified as either marital or separate, with the
courts dividing only the marital property; in others, the courts divide all property owned
by either spouse. See 2 H. Clark, supra note 5, § 16.1, at 177-78. The theory of shared
enterprise derived from the community property system underlies the equitable distribu-
tion laws of the common-law states. See J. Gregory, supra note 31, 1.02, at 1-5. Some
common-law states grant each spouse a "vested interest" in the marital property after a
matrimonial action is filed, although the amount of the interest is unknown until the final
decree is entered by the divorce court. 2 H. Clark, supra note 5, at 177-78 nn. 11-12. The
Uniform Marital Property Act provides that each spouse owns an "undivided one-half
interest in the marital property" at the time the property is acquired. Unif. Marital Prop.
Act § 4(c) and comment, reprinted in Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 201:0100-0101 (1983); see
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 766.31(3) (West 1988). In contrast, under most equitable distribution
statutes, family law interests in marital property are "delayed-action in nature and come
to maturity only during the dissolution process." Unif. Marital Prop. Act § 4 comment,
reprinted in Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 201:0101 (1983).
42. See 2 H. Clark, supra note 5, § 16.1, at 176-77; J. Gregory, supra note 31, 1.03,
at 1-6. Most statutes provide for either equal or equitable distribution. See generally
State Divorce Laws, Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 401:001-453:001 (1989) (summarizing each
state's divorce property statutes). In statutes or through judicial interpretation, states
also usually provide the court with factors to consider. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 9-12-
315(a)(1)(A) (1991) (one-half to each party but equitable distribution permitted if court
takes nine factors into consideration); Col. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-113(1) (1987) (equitable
distribution based on all relevant factors, including four specified); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§ 236(B)(5)(d) (McKinney 1986) (equitable distribution, listing thirteen factors, includ-
ing "any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper"). See
generally State Divorce Laws, supra, at 401:001-453:001 (surveying statutory law on fac-
tors courts take into account in making property divisions); 2 H. Clark, supra note 5,
§ 16.3, at 190-96 (same). The equitable distribution provision of the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act" 'authorizes the division.., as the primary means of providing for the
future financial needs of the spouses.'" Levy, An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues,
23 Fam. L.Q. 147, 148 n.4 (1989) (quoting Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Unif.
Marriage and Divorce Act, § 307, 9A U.L.A. 5 (1987)); see also 2 H. Clark, supra note 5,
§ 16.1, at 181-82 (justifiable to infer from statutes that "purpose of the property division
is as much to provide for the financial needs of the spouses after the divorce as to award
to each what he or she equitably owns").
43. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
44. See 2 H. Clark, supra note 5, § 19.1, at 408-09 (discussing settlement agreements).
45. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
46. See 2 H. Clark, supra note 5, § 16.1, at 175.
47. See id.
48. See Scheible, supra note 31, at 2-3.
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lution through negotiation rather than litigation,49 the policies of current
divorce law attempt to afford both former spouses a fresh start.so
B. The Debtor's Fresh Start and Divorce Property Divisions
1. The Homestead Exemption and Section 522(f)(1)
Bankruptcy law seeks to provide a fresh start of another sort-a fresh
start for debtors.5 By the 1970s, the ascendancy of the consumer credit
industry5 2 and a "rising tide of consumer bankruptcies"" threatened this
traditional policy of protecting debtors, leading Congress to modernize
bankruptcy law in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.1' Placing strong
emphasis on effective implementation" of the fresh start policy for debt-
ors,5 6 Congress sought to ensure that the debtor would emerge from
bankruptcy with most of his debts discharged," and with at least some of
49. See id. at 2; 2 H. Clark, supra note 5, § 19.1, at 410 (general considerations relat-
ing to purposes and advantages of property settlements).
50. See Scheible, supra note 31, at 3.
51. See infra note 56.
52. See House Report, supra note 15, at 116, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5963, 6076 ("Consumer finance has become a major industry, and more
and more goods have been sold on credit.").
53. See I Report of the Comm'n on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1973) [hereinafter Commission Report), reprinted
in [2 App. Legis. Hist.] L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy I at 1-2 (15th ed. 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.)]; see also 124 Cong. Rec. S14,719 (daily ed. Sept. 7,
1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in [3 App. Legis. Hist.] Collier on Bank-
ruptcy (15th ed.), supra, at viii-4.
54. See [Bankruptcy Reform] Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978). The 1978 statute, often referred to as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, re-
placed the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. See G. Treister, supra note 11, § 1.01, at 1. See gener-
ally Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, reprinted in [2 App. Legis.
Hist.], Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.), supra note 53, at vi, xxv-xxvii (describing ten-
year legislative history of Bankruptcy Code and suggesting order in which to use sources
for interpreting Code's provisions).
55. See Ginsberg, Introduction to the Symposium: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 -. A Primer, 28 DePaul L.Rev. 923, 923 (1979) (Code reflects a "swing of the
pendulum from the spirit of creditor protection to the spirit of debtor protection in the
legal age of the consumer").
56. House Report, supra note 15, at 126 ("a debtor that goes through bankruptcy
comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start"), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6087. The "fresh start" concept has traditionally
been a primary goal of bankruptcy law. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
(1934) (bankruptcy "gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor.., a new opportunity in
life... unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt").
57. See House Report, supra note 15, at 128 ("Perhaps the most important element of
the fresh start for a consumer debtor after bankruptcy is discharge."), reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6089. A discharge bars "all future legal proceed-
ings for the enforcement of the discharged debt .... ." [Index & Tables] Collier on
Bankruptcy (15th ed.), supra note 53, at GT-5. Discharge measures the rights of claim-
ants against the individual debtor and determines which assets should be kept from credi-
tors. See T. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 225 (1986). The primary
effect of discharge for the debtor is relief from personal liability for pre-petition debts.
See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988) (provision defining protections for debtor to preserve effective-
ness of discharge). If a debt is discharged, the creditor's non-bankruptcy entitlement will
1990]
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his property exempt from the claims of his creditors.58
In keeping with the fresh start policy, section 522(b)"9 makes the tradi-
tional homestead exemption' available to debtors. Debtors' exemptions
are given further protection61 in section 522(f)(1),62 which enables debt-
ors to avoid certain liens on their exempt property, including their home-
steads. 3 The extent to which debtors can avoid a lien depends primarily
upon the types and amounts of homestead property they can exempt. 64
The Code authorizes states65 to choose between limiting the debtor to the
exemptions allowed under state law6 6 or permitting a debtor to choose
be treated under bankruptcy law. See T. Jackson, supra, at 225. The creditor will share
in the distribution from the debtor's estate and may not seek any further payment from
the debtor. See G. Treister, supra note 11, §§ 7.05, at 311, and 7.10(g), at 347 (effect of
discharge for individual debtors in Chapters 7 and 13).
58. See G. Treister, supra note 11, § 7.02, at 299 ("One way the Bankruptcy code
works to give the debtor a fresh start is through the exemption provisions.").
59. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
60. See generally T. Crandall, supra note 11, S 6.07[l][d], at 6-132-35 (describing state
homestead exemptions). The federal definition of homestead refers to property that the
debtor or a dependant uses as a residence but also includes personal property and several
other kinds of real property up to an aggregate value of $7,500. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)
(1988). Although most states have exemption laws, their substance varies widely. See T.
Crandall, supra note 11, 6.07[l][d], at 6-132. State definitions of homestead usually
require that the property be used as a residence. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 6.13.010(1) (Supp. 1991) ("The homestead consists of the dwelling house"); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 815.20 (Supp. 1990) ("An exempt homestead... selected by a resident owner and
occupied by him or her"). But see Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 41.002 (1991 Supp.) (defining
homestead as property "used for the purposes of an urban home or as a place to exercise
a calling or business in the same urban area").
The bankruptcy laws of the United States have always permitted debtors to exempt
some property from the reach of creditors. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.), supra
note 53, 1 522.01, at 522-8. The homestead exemption has been a primary source of
debtor protection since 1839, when it first appeared in the laws of the Republic of Texas.
See Riesenfeld, Homestead and Bankruptcy in Colorado and Elsewhere, 56 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 175, 175 (1985).
61. For a comparison with debtors' lien avoidance rights on exempt property under
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, see infra note 166.
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
63. See id. The bankruptcy trustee has broad lien avoidance powers; the debtor is
limited to section 522(f). See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988); Treister, supra note 11, § 7.03,
at 305; see also Treister, supra note 11, § 4.03, at 137-91 (survey of trustee's avoiding
powers).
64. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(1)-(2) (1988).
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
66. Like the 1898 Act, the Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to use state exemption
statutes. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.), supra note 53, % 522.02, at 522-10-11.
In contrast to the 1898 Act, however, and like the 1867 Bankruptcy Act, the Code also
offers a federal exemption scheme. See id. States may withdraw or "opt out" of the
federal scheme, thereby restricting debtors domiciled in those states to their state exemp-
tion laws, but section 522(b)(1) requires that states must take the step of indicating specif-
ically that its citizens are not authorized to use the federal exemption. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(1); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.), supra note 53, 522.02, at 522-12; see,
e.g., Neb. Rev. State § 25-15,105 (1989) ("The federal exemptions provided in [the Bank-
ruptcy Code] are hereby rejected by the State of Nebraska. The State of Nebraska elects
to retain the personal exemptions provided under Nebraska statutes and the Nebraska
Constitution ... "); N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 284 (McKinney 1990 and Supp. 1991)
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the exemptions provided in the Code.67 Some three-quarters of the states
require debtors to use their state homestead statutes. 68 Other states al-
low debtors to elect either their state homestead law or the federal home-
stead provision.69 Because homestead allowances vary widely from state
to state, the homestead liens that debtors can avoid range from below the
federal level of $7,500 to substantially over $80,000.70 Consequently, the
proportional impact of homestead lien avoidance on divorce property di-
visions is dependent upon the debtor's homestead entitlement."'
Within the homestead allowance, debtors may avoid liens encumber-
("debtors domiciled in this state are not authorized to exempt from the estate property
that is specified under subsection (d) of [§ 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code]").
Congress rejected efforts by reformers to require a uniform federal exemption in order
to overcome the wide variations in state laws. See I Commission Report 169-71, supra
note 53, reprinted in [2 App. Legis. Hist.] Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.), supra note
53, at 1-1-169-71. See generally Haines, Section 522's Opt-Out Clause.: Debtors' Bank-
ruptcy Exemptions in a Sorry State, 1983 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 5-10 (background of the "opt-
out" clause).
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988) (defining the federal "menu" listing types of prop-
erty and the aggregate value of each that can be exempted). In addition to real or per-
sonal property used as a residence, types of exempt property include one motor vehicle,
household furnishings, professional books or tools, professionally prescribed health aids
and various benefits. See id. Section 522(d)(1) is commonly referred to as the federal
homestead exemption. See G. Treister, supra note 11, § 7.02, at 301. In addition to the
section 522(d) list, debtors may also exempt any property that is exempt under federal
law, such as social security payments and veterans benefits. See II U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(2)(A); House Report, supra note 15, at 360-61, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6316. State exemption provisions vary widely in types and
amounts of property that can be exempted. See, e.g., N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law §§ 282-
283 (McKinney 1990) (exemptions include motor vehicles not exceeding 52,400 in value);
S. D. Codified Laws Ann. § 43-45-2 (1983) (books and pictures absolutely exempt).
68. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.), supra note 53, 522.02, at 522-11 n.4a
(listing states that have enacted legislation prohibiting their citizens from electing the
section 522(d) federal exemption scheme).
69. See id. at 522.02, at 522-I1.
70. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-10-2 (Supp. 1990) (S5,000 homestead exemption); N.D.
Cent. Code § 47-18-01 (Supp. 1989) ($80,000 of debtor's equity); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R.
5206 (McKinney Supp. 1990) ($10,000); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 6.13.030 (Supp. 1991)
($30,000); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 815.20(l) (Supp. 1990) (S40,000). Some states define home-
stead allowance in acreage rather than dollar value. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2301
(1983) (160 acres of farming land or one acre within an incorporated town or city); Tex.
Prop. Code Ann. § 41.002 (Vernon 1991 Supp.) (urban home, not more than one acre;,
rural home, up to 100 acres for a single, adult person, or up to 200 acres for a family).
Some commentators have criticized the Code's exemption provisions on the grounds
that debtors in states with liberal exemptions are able to get "a 'head start' rather than a
'fresh start'." See Vukowich, supra note 19, at 802. The constitutionality of the opt-out
provision has withstood challenge in the appellate courts against arguments that the
bankruptcy laws are required to be uniform and that the opt-out provision is an imper-
missible delegation of congressional power to the states. See T. Crandall, supra note I1, I
13.07[l], at 13-32-33; G. Treister, supra note 11, § 7.02, at 299-301 (citing, as an example,
Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1983)).
71. In Farrey v. Sanderfoot, for example, the debtor husband claimed the 540,000
Wisconsin homestead exemption and then sought to avoid his ex-spouse's lien of over
$29,000, which was her entire share of the net marital assets. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot
(In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 599 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No.
90-350).
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ing homestead rights when the following conditions are met:72 first, the
debtor must have an interest73 in the property on which the lien is
fixed;74  second, the lien must impair or reduce75 an exemption to which
the debtor is entitled;76 finally, the lien must be a judicial lien, which is
defined in the Code as a lien "obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration,
or other legal or equitable process or proceeding."77 Significantly, the
Code differentiates between judicial liens and liens that are security inter-
ests created by agreement. 78 Neither the language of section 522(f)(1)79
nor its legislative history,80 however, expressly addresses divorce-related
liens. Yet because divorce decrees, whether contested or uncontested,
are obtained by a state court judgment,81 debtors seeking avoidance may
argue that property division homestead liens that are part of a divorce
decree are judicial liens.82
72. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988). See also Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 601 (listing
three requirements for lien avoidance) (citations omitted). The majority view holds that
section 522(f) applies to state exemption statutes in states that have opted out. See G.
Treister, supra note 11, § 7.03, at 307; Bowmar, supra note 18, at 385; see also infra note
101 (discussion of judicial debate over federal pre-emption of state exemptions conflicting
with the intent of section 522(f)).
73. See Bowmar, supra note 18, at 388-91 (discussing issues involved in determining
the debtor's interest). The debtor can avoid the lien only to the extent of the exemption
allowance; thus, if the property division exceeds the exemption allowance, the excess
amount of the lien will remain valid to the extent of the debtor's remaining interest in the
property and may be enforced by the creditor. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.),
supra note 53, 522.29, at 522-90.
74. See infra notes 107-114, 122-133 and accompanying text (on the requirement that
the lien fix on an interest of the debtor in property).
75. On impairment and methods for calculating the debtor's interest, see infra note
100.
76. See infra note 101.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1988); see also supra note 18 (discussing liens in
bankruptcy).
78. A judicial lien is specifically distinguished in the Code from two other kinds of
liens, which are not subject to section 522(f)(1): a "security interest," which means "a
lien created by an agreement," 11 U.S.C. § 101(45) (1988), and a statutory lien, which is
a lien "arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions," id.
§ 101(47), such as mechanics' liens. See Bowmar, supra note 18, at 376 and nn. 5-6.
Security interests are voluntary, consensual types of liens, such as real estate mortgages.
See id. (comprehensive discussion of security interests and statutory liens in bankruptcy);
see also infra notes 117, 140 and accompanying text (on consent in property settlement
agreements).
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).
80. See infra notes 166-178.
81. See generally 2 H. Clark, supra note 5, § 16.1, at 176 (discussing authority of state
courts to order property divisions).
82. See, e.g., Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir.)
("no doubt that [non-debtor spouse's lien], granted by Wisconsin Circuit Court ... was
obtained by 'legal proceedings' "), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350); In re
Porter, 112 Bankr. 979, 980 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (debtor "alleges that a judicial lien
was created . . . by virtue of a judgment during the judicial dissolution of their
marriage").
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2. Dischargeability and Lien Avoidance: Section 523(a)(5) and
Section 522(f)(1)
While debtors seeking to attack divorce decree homestead liens must
meet the specific requirements of section 522(f)(1), debtors are also lim-
ited by other Code provisions that require that the underlying debt must
be dischargeable; 3 if it is not, exempt property is available for the satis-
faction of the debt, whether the debt is secured or not.84 Under section
523(a)(5), 85 property division debts that are intended to provide alimony,
maintenance or child support are non-dischargeable,86 and both the
debtor and the debtor's exempt property remain liable for their pay-
ment.8 7 But property division debts that are not intended as family sup-
port, even if part of a pre-divorce agreement of the parties,88 are
dischargeable,89 and the debtor is excused from personal responsibility
for paying for them.90 The exempt property itself, however, continues to
be available for the satisfaction of a dischargeable debt, unless the lien
securing the debt is avoidable under section 522(f)(1) or one of the
Code's other avoidance provisions. 91 Thus, a homestead lien securing a
dischargeable property division debt is preserved and survives bank-
ruptcy unless it is avoided.92
83. See II U.S.C. §§ 522(c), 523(a)(5) (1988). On discharge, see supra note 57.
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (1988) ("property exempted under this section is not liable
... for any debt... except... a debt of a kind specified in ... section 523(a)(5)").
85. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988). Section 523 provides for exceptions to discharge.
Section 523(a)(5) specifies, as one type of non-dischargeable debts, debts "to a... former
spouse... for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse .... in connection
with a... divorce dcree ... or property settlement agreement. " Id. Regardless of the
terminology used by the divorce court, the liability must be "actually in the nature of
alimony, maintenance, or support." Id § 523(a)(5)(B).
86. See id. § 523(a)(5). For a discussion of federal court determinations of dis-
chargeability, see infra note 188 and accompanying text.
87. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) (1988). A determination of liability assumes that the
other prerequisites to liability are met, such as filing a proper claim under section 501 and
502; see I1 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502 (1988); see also supra note 11 (on allowed claims).
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
89. Id.
90. See supra note 57.
91. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(A)(i) (1988). The principle that valid liens on exempt
property survive the bankruptcy discharge was established in Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S.
617, 620-61 (1886) and reaffirmed in the House and Senate comments on section 522(c).
See House Report, supra note 15, at 361, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 5963, 6316-17; S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5861-62; see also Bowmar, supra note 18, at 379
(discharge of debt "means only discharge of the personal liability of the debtor," a holder
of a lien that survives bankruptcy may resort only to property itself for payment) (empha-
sis in original).
92. Whether the dischargeability of a property division debt should be given weight
in, or even be determinative of, the avoidability of a lien to secure that debt is a subject of
controversy in the divorce decree homestead lien avoidance cases. See, eg., Stedman v.
Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1989) (award of property would
have been dischargeable in bankruptcy under section 523(a)(5); allowing avoidance is
thus "consistent with Congress's policy"); Coffman v. Coffman (In re Coffman), 52
Bankr. 667, 676 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985) (debt found dischargeable under section 523(a)(5)
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As the Code applies to the debtor's rights with respect to divorce prop-
erty divisions, the personal liability of the debtor is determined under
section 523(a)(5), while the availability of the homestead property as the
source for payment of the debt is determined by the avoidance inquiry
under section 522(f)(1). 93 The divorce decree lien avoidance issue, how-
ever, involves only property divisions that are dischargeable.94 Conse-
quently, when such liens are avoided, the non-debtor spouse, reduced to
the status of an unsecured creditor, is limited to sharing the proceeds of
the pre-petition estate with other general creditors. 95 When bankruptcy
intervenes after divorce but before the property division debt is satis-
fied,96 application of section 522(f)(1) to divorce decree homestead liens
brings into conflict the fresh start goals of the divorced couple as debtor
and non-debtor spouse.
II. DOES THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 522(F)(1) ALLOW DEBTORS
To AVOID DIVORCE DECREE LIENS ON THEIR
HOMESTEADS?
Determining whether divorce decree homestead liens97 qualify as liens
subject to invalidation by the debtor is problematic in that its language
can arguably support either avoidance or non-avoidance. 98 Such secured
and lien avoided without discussion). But see Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot),
899 F.2d 598 (lien avoided but dischargeability of debt not part of court's analysis), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350); Williams v. Williams (In re Williams), 38
Bankr. 224, 226-27 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1984) (lien not avoided; analyzes issues of dis-
chargeability and avoidance separately); see also supra notes 120, 146, 192-193 and ac-
companying text (on relationship between dischargeability of debt and avoidance of
liens).
93. Although by its language section 522(f)(1) does not require that the bankruptcy
court analyze the nature of the debt under section 523(a)(5) when making a lien avoid-
ance determination, see 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988), non-debtor spouses sometimes de-
fend against avoidance on the basis of non-dischargeability of the property division debt,
thus leading the court to make determinations of both dischargeability and avoidance.
See Coffman, 52 Bankr. at 676; Williams, 38 Bankr. at 225-27.
94. See Pederson, 875 F.2d at 784; In re Sanderfoot, 83 Bankr. 564, 566 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis.), rev'd, 92 Bankr. 802 (E.D. Wis. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re
Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350).
95. See supra note 57.
96. The frequency with which recently divorced individuals file for bankruptcy is
well-documented. See Scheible, supra note 31, at 3 & n.8. In commenting on the Seventh
Circuit's decision affirming the husband debtor's motion to avoid his ex-wife's homestead
lien in Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, one journalist noted, "The very ordinariness of the
Sanderfoot story suggests how far-reaching the case's ramifications could be."
Margolick, Can Bankruptcy Reduce The Price of a Divorce?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1991, at
9, col. 2.
Nearly 1.2 million divorces were granted by state courts in 1988. See United States
Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 89 (1990). Personal bank-
ruptcies filed and pending nearly doubled between 1981 and 1988, rising from 312,914 to
526,066. See id. at 532.
97. See generally supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (on requirements for sec-
tion 522(f)(1) lien avoidance).
98. See infra Parts IIA-B and accompanying text.
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claims must be liens (1) "fixing... on an interest of the debtor in prop-
erty,"99 (2) obtained by a legal or equitable proceeding"°° and (3) impair-
ing an exemption'o° to which the debtor would otherwise have been
entitled.'12 One approach focuses on the technical definitions in the
Code and its fresh start principles, leading to affirmance of the debtor's
avoidance powers. 0 3 The other relies primarily on the equitable princi-
ples of modem divorce law and the nature of the marital relationship to
distinguish divorce decree homestead liens from the federal definition of
judicial lien, with the result that the lien is preserved for the non-debtor
spouse. o4
A. Reading The Language of Section 522 (f)(1) So That Lien
Avoidance Must Be Granted
The conclusion that the language and principles of the Bankruptcy
99. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1988); see also supra note 78 (describing liens).
101. See In re Porter, 112 Bankr. 979, 984-85 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990); see generally
Bowmar, supra note 18,passim (for issues relating to methods of calculating impairment).
For a discussion of whether states that 'opt out' can legislate exceptions to state exemp-
tions that otherwise would be subject to avoidance by the debtor under section 522(f), see
infra note 101.
102. An unsettled issue relating to impairment of the debtor's exemption is whether
state exemption statutes can exclude divorce decree homestead liens and thereby frustrate
section 522(f)(1). The debtor's exemption would not be impaired because the debtor
would never have been entitled to exempt the property secured by the lien in the first
instance and therefore the lien is not avoidable. See, e.g., In re Stone, 119 Bankr. 222,
236 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1990) (liens in which debtors elected the Washington homestead
exemption are type of lien excluded from state exemption statute; therefore, lien underly-
ing judicial lien imposed by the divorce court does not impair state exemption and judi-
cial lien is unavoidable); Holtzhauser v. Holtzhauser (In re Holtzhauser), 117 Bankr. 519,
521 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (court construed state law and concluded that "[u]nder Ne-
braska law the debtor may not invoke the homestead exemption in the home owned dur-
ing the marriage, against the claims of his former spouse under a divorce decree"). The
failure of a divorce-related lien to impair the debtor's state homestead exemption as a
ground for denying avoidance has not been specifically challenged in the circuit courts.
See supra note 25.
For a discussion of the relationship between state exemptions and the general federal
exemption statutes, see 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.), supra note 53, § 522.29, at
522-95-96 and n.2a (prevailing view is that states cannot defeat section 522(f)); see also T.
Crandall, supra note 11, 13.07[1], at 13-34 (federal courts differ on whether states can
preclude lien avoidance under 522(f)). See generally, Parkinson, The Lien Avoidance
Section of the Bankruptcy Code: Can It Be Avoided By State Exemption Statutes?, 11
Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 319 (1984) (analysis of history and issues relating to federal-state ex-
emption provisions). The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on
whether section 522(f)(1) preempts state exemption laws. See Owen v. Owen, 877 F.2d
44 (1lth Cir. 1989), cerL granted, 110 S. Ct. 2166 (1990) (No. 89-1008).
The state exemption issue is beyond the scope of this Note. Determination of the sta-
tus of divorce decree homestead liens under state exemption laws would not address their
avoidability when debtors elect the federal exemption scheme. This Note argues for a
uniform exception for divorce decree homestead liens under section 522(f)(1).
103. See infra Part IIA and accompanying text.
104. See infra Part IIB and accompanying text.
1990]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
Code require that debtors have a right to avoid1"5 divorce decree home-
stead liens is based on the view that such a lien fits within the require-
ments of section 522(f)(1). 10 6 The requirement of a lien "fixing on an
interest of the debtor in the property" 10 7 is met because the divorce
court's judgment effectuates a sequential exchange when the words in the
dissolution decree grant the marital residence to the debtor spouse sub-
ject to the non-debtor's lien.108 The divorce decree extinguishes any
prior interest of the spouses in the marital property.' 0 9 Next, the decree
creates new interests by giving title to the debtor spouse and a secured
money judgment to the non-debtor spouse."' Lastly, the decree fixes the
lien onto the debtor spouse's new interest."' The non-debtor spouse's
property interest becomes "simply collateral for a debt."', 2 Accordingly,
the non-debtor spouse's prior interest in the homestead" 3 is "simply ir-
relevant" because the divorce decree terminated that interest." 4
105. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 605-06 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350); Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875
F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1989); Wood v. Godfrey (In re Godfrey), 102 Bankr. 769, 773
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989); In re Porter, 112 Bankr. 979, 982 (Bankr. D. Mo. 1990); Duncan
v. Sczepanski (In re Duncan, 85 Bankr. 80, 82 (W.D. Wis. 1988); In re Showinsky, 117
Bankr. 284, 287 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990); Boggess v. Boggess (In re Boggess), 105
Bankr. 470, 475 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989); In re Brothers, 100 Bankr. 565, 567-68 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1989); In re Alvarado, 92 Bankr. 923, 926-27 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988).
106. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
108. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 602.
109. See id.; infra note 114 and accompanying text.
110. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 602.
111. See id. The Sanderfoot court noted that "the 'convoluted theory' [of preexisting
interest] espoused in Boyd [see infra note 124] ignored the fact that 'the decree gives one
party title outright and that is the interest to which the lien attaches.'" Id. (quoting
Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935, 939 (10th Cir. 1988)), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990)
(No. 90-350). For a discussion of Maus, see supra note 117.
112. Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1115 (8th Cir. 1984) (Ross, J. dissenting).
Judge Ross noted in dissent, "What had been a property interest became simply collateral
for a debt .... the lien must have attached to [the debtor's] interest in the house, for no
one else possessed any ownership interest in the house."). Id.; accord Sanderfoot, 899
F.2d at 601-02; Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1989),
Judge Ross suggested that there would have been no problem if the court had given the
non-debtor spouse an ownership interest rather than a lien. See Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1115
n.1 (Ross, J., dissenting). But see infra note 181 (on why joint ownership after divorce
may not be a fair resolution of the issue on policy grounds).
113. See infra notes 122-129 and accompanying text.
114. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir.) (quoting
Duncan v. Sczepanski (In re Duncan), 85 Bankr. 80, 82 (W.D. Wis. 1988)), cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350).
The Sanderfoot court also noted that, to the extent state property law was relevant,
great weight had been accorded in reaching its decision to the two Wisconsin district
courts that had avoided divorce decree homestead liens. See id. at 602 n. 12.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's reversal of the bankruptcy court deci-
sion denying lien avoidance. See id. at 606, aff'g 92 Bankr. 802 (E.D. Wis. 1988). The
bankruptcy court applied the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d
1112 (8th Cir. 1984) and determined that under Wisconsin's equitable property division
law as well as Wisconsin's Marital Property Act, the non-debtor wife had an interest in
the homestead that survived the divorce because it did not attach to the debtor's interest.
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The rationale supporting lien avoidance maintains that the require-
ment of section 522(f")(1) that the lien be a judicial lien is clearly met in a
contested divorce because the encumbrance is imposed by the court with-
out prior consent of the parties."' The lien therefore falls within the
Code's "unambiguous definition" '" 6 of judicial lien. In an uncontested
divorce, however, where the parties' agreement is incorporated into the
final decree, a finding that the lien is a judicial lien requires looking to the
final court order making the property settlement judicially enforceable
rather than to the underlying consensual arrangement.""
By focusing largely on the language of the lien avoidance section and
the interlocking statutory provisions"' defining that language, it is possi-
ble to be led "ineluctably" to the conclusion that divorce decree liens on
exempt homestead property are avoidable."' Permitting lien avoidance
arguably supports Congressional policy that property settlement debts
are dischargeable because the debtor's fresh start is more fully protected
from the post-marital obligation.' 20 Although affirmation of lien avoid-
See In re Sanderfoot, 83 Bankr. 564, 568 (Bankr. E-D. Wis.), rev'd 92 Bank. 802 (E.D.
Wis. 1988), aff'd sub nor. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 606(7th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990). For the approach to lien avoidance that
focuses on the non-debtor spouse's prior interest, see infra notes 122-132 and accompany-
ing text.
115. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 605.
116. See id.; see also Pederson v. Stedman (In re Pederson), 78 Bankr. 264, 267 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1987) (lien "fits precisely within the Code's definition of 'judicial lien' "), aff'd
sub nor. Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989). The
Sanderfoot court expressly rejected other rationales developed by courts to "salvag[e]
liens enforcing property settlements." 899 F.2d at 604 (quoting Pederson, 875 F.2d at
783 n.4). For alternative definitions of the divorce decree lien, see infra notes 135-143
and accompanying text.
117. There is no recorded decision of an appellate court granting lien avoidance in a
divorce in which a property agreement embodying the parties' consent was incorporated
into the final decree, except Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 1988). In that
case, unlike the Sanderfoot line of cases, the lien was not placed on the homestead in the
divorce document. See Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259, 266-67 n. 11
(10th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing Maus because in Maus, lien was not "created in the di-
vorce decree itself') (emphasis in original). But see In re McCormmack, No. OR-90-
1341 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting trial court determination that the mortgage instru-
ment, rather than the divorce decree, was "the operative document that created the
lien"), rev'g 111 Bankr. 330 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990); In re Showinsky, 117 Bankr. 284, 287
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990) (lien avoided despite consent of parties to property agreement
incorporated into decree).
118. See Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781, 782 (9th Cir. 1989).
119. See id. ("Although somewhat complex, the interlocking statutory provisions lead
ineluctably to the conclusion that [the] lien was avoidable... "). Courts granting lien
avoidance also find that, under the facts of the particular case, the impairment require-
ment has been met. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 605; Pederson, 875 F.2d at 782 & n.2.
On impairment, see supra notes I00-101 and accompanying text.
120. See Pederson, 875 F.2d at 784 (citing Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1116 (8th
Cir. 1984) (Ross, J., dissenting)); Duncan v. Sczepanski (In re Duncan), 85 Bankr. 80, 83(W.D. Wis. 1988); Pederson v. Stedman (In re Pederson), 78 Bankr. 264, 267 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1989); see also infra notes 146, 191-193 and accompanying text (on the relationship be-
tween sections 522(f)(1) and 523(a)(5)).
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ance fails to address the special nature of marital property rights in a
dissolution decree, the rationale for granting divorce decree lien avoid-
ance is consistent with the view that the Code provisions must be "given
their plain meaning despite the seemingly inequitable results in a divorce
setting."'
12
'
B. Reading The Language of Section 522(f)(1) as Inapplicable to
Divorce Decree Homestead Liens
Another approach to the problem of whether divorce decree home-
stead liens are avoidable by the debtor draws on modem divorce prop-
erty concepts 122 and concludes that when a divorce decree gives the
debtor spouse the marital home, the lien does not attach to the debtor's
interest. 23 Rather, the lien protects a pre-existing interest of the non-
debtor spouse 24 in the family residence that was created during or as a
result of the marriage 25 and under the state's equitable distribution stat-
ute. 26 Under this theory, the spousal interest pre-exists the final divorce
judgment and remains valid afterwards until the debtor's property divi-
sion obligation is satisfied, whether or not the divorce was contested. 27
121. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir.) (quoting In
re Boggess, 105 Bankr. 470, 474 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989)), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990) (No. 90-350); see also Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781, 784
(9th Cir. 1989) (arguments about injustice or undue interference with authority of state
divorce courts "must be directed to Congress"); Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1116
(8th Cir. 1984) (Ross, J., dissenting) (avoidance is "harsh result" but decision not to
reach such liens is for Congress); Duncan, 85 Bankr. at 83 ("This Court declines to join
the herd of prior courts who have trampled the Bankruptcy Code in a rush to achieve
their own perception of justice in the divorce setting.").
122. See, e.g., Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1114 ("under Minnesota law it is assumed that marital
property is shared property"); In re Rittenhouse, 103 B.R. 250, 255 (D. Kan. 1989) (dis-
cussing marital property interests under Kansas law). On state divorce property law, see
supra note 41.
123. See Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1114-15.
124. See id. at 1114.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1114; see also Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 606
(7th Cir.) (Posner, J., dissenting) (criticizing Sanderfoot and Pederson approach), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990). In Boyd, the Eighth Circuit denied avoidance of the non-
debtor husband's $7,000 homestead lien. See 741 F.2d 1112, 1115 (8th Cir. 1984).
Under Minnesota law, both spouses had an undivided interest in marital property before
the divorce. See id. at 1114. The husband never owned the marital home but did contrib-
ute to mortgage payments and to the home's improvement. See id.
Many courts have adopted the Boyd theory that the lien protects a pre-existing prop-
erty interest of the non-debtor spouse and is unavoidable because it does not fix on the
debtor's interest. See In re Rittenhouse, 103 Bankr. 250, 255 (D. Kan. 1989) (debtor's
interest transferred subject to non-debtor spouse's preexisting interest; therefore lien not
avoidable); Zachary v. Zachary (In re Zachary), 99 Bankr. 916, 919-20 (S.D. Ind. 1989)
(same); Holtzhauser v. Holtzhauser (In re Holtzhauser), 117 Bankr. 519, 520 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1990) (same); In re Warren, 91 Bankr. 930, 931-32 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988) (same); see
also Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 607 (Posner, J., dissenting) (advocating Boyd position and
noting that most bankruptcy judges have also adopted it). But see supra notes 105-114
and accompanying text (on approach rejecting pre-existing interest theory).
127. See Boyd v. Robinson, 31 Bankr. 591, 595-96 (D. Minn. 1983) (to avoid a lien in
1990] BANKRUPTCY AND DIVORCE
The homestead lien protects the non-debtor's prior interest; therefore, it
never fixes or attaches onto the debtor's interest or portion. 12s As a re-
sult, the lien fails to meet the requirement of section 522(f)(1) that it fix
on the debtor's interest in the property.
1 29
Another line of reasoning supporting the view that the lien does not
attach to the debtor's interest revolves around the critical issue of tim-
ing. 130 The timing argument takes the position that when both the
debtor's interest in the entire property and the lien on that property arise
in the same transaction, the debtor does not have the interest at the time
the court places the lien on it.' 3' Because the lien is created in the same
document that gives the debtor his or her interest in the property, the
lien qualifies that interest from the start. 32 In this way, the simultaneous
transfer of interests in a dissolution decree distinguishes a divorce decree
lien from other judicial liens intended to secure debts. 33
Failure to meet any one of section 522(f)(1)'s requirements is sufficient
to deny lien avoidance; 134 thus, an alternative basis for rejecting the
debtor's lien avoidance motion is to identify the lien so as to exclude it
from the Code's definition of a judicial lien. 3 5 In a contested divorce,
where agreement of the parties is clearly absent, the analysis rests not on
the technical form of the state court judgment but on the underlying
contested divorce but preserve it where there is a property settlement "ignores the func-
tion and purpose of the marriage dissolution proceedings and creates an artifical and
unfair distinction between the two manners of distributing property"), aff'd, 741 F.2d
1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
128. See Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1114-15.
129. See id.
130. See In re Rittenhouse, 103 Bankr. 250, 255 (D. Kan. 1989) (citing Zachary v.
Zachary (In re Zachary), 99 Bankr. 916, 919 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
131. "It is settled in the nonfamily context that a debtor cannot avoid a lien on an
interest acquired after the lien attached .... The principle should be the same if the
interest and lien arise from the same transaction." Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re
Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 607 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), cert.
granted, II1 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350); see also Owen v. Owen, 86 Bankr. 691, 694
(M.D. Fla. 1988) ("A judgment attaching to property and becoming a lien prior to bank-
ruptcy survives the discharge and remains enforceable"), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2166
(1990) (89-1008). For a discussion of the issue on which the Supreme Court agreed to
hear Owen, see supra note 101.
132. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 607-08 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("There was no instant
at which [the debtor] owned the property free and clear of the wife's interest."); see also
Zachary v. Zachary (In re Zachary), 99 Bankr. 916, 919 (S.D. Ind. 1989) ("The lien
attaches at the same time as title is transferred; therefore, it does not attach to an interest
of the debtor in property for purposes of section 522(f)(1).").
133. See Hart v. Hart (In re Hart), 50 Bankr. 956, 961-62 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985);
Williams v. Williams (In re Williams), 38 Bankr. 224, 228 (Bankr. N.D. OkIa. 1984); In
re Thomas, 32 Bankr. 11, 12 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983).
134. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
135. Some courts find that the lien is a judicial lien but because it does not fix on the
interest of the debtor, the lien is not avoidable. See Holtzhauser v. Holtzhauser (In re
Holtzhauser), 117 Bankr. 519, 520 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990); Williams v. Williams (In re
Williams), 38 Bankr. 224, 228 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1984).
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intent of the court to make a fair distribution of the marital assets.,3 6 One
view of the lien, linked to the pre-existing interest theory, 137 is that the
lien is transformed into a mortgage that simply recognizes and provides a
remedy to enforce a pre-existing interest.138 Under this view, the lien is
not "obtained by judgment" nor is it the usual type of judicial lien.' 39
Where there is a property settlement incorporated into the decree, the
consensual nature of the underlying lien makes it appear to be similar to
a security interest or purchase-money obligation, so that the lien is una-
voidable although judicially sanctioned.14 When the focus is the
spouse's property rights under state law, it is also possible to identify the
lien in a judicially determined divorce as a non-avoidable security
interest. 141
Yet another view of the nature of the lien, based on a somewhat differ-
ent rationale, results in denial of lien avoidance by finding the lien to be
an implied equitable lien, even in the absence of a consensual agreement,
because the lien is placed on specific property that is intended to be the
136. See Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 1984); Zachary v. Zachary
(In re Zachary), 99 Bankr. 916, 919 (D. Ind. 1989).
137. See supra notes 122-129 and accompanying text.
138. See Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Boyd v.
Robinson (In re Boyd), 31 Bankr. 591, 595 (D. Minn. 1983) (award of lien interest in
homestead "stated in express mortgage language"; lienholder's satisfaction must derive
from specific asset, not general property of debtor), aff'd, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984);
Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 606 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., dissenting) (divorce court "trans-
formed [wife's interest] from that of co-owner to that of mortgagee"), cert granted, 111 S.
Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350). But see Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1115 (Ross, J., dissenting) ("If
state law were allowed to vary what would otherwise be a judicial lien by merely calling
the interest an 'equitable mortgage,' havoc would result.").
139. See Zachary, 99 Bankr. at 920 (" 'To label this a judicial lien merely because it is
a lien which was imposed in a judicial proceeding puts form over substance.' ") (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Boyd v. Robinson, 31 Bankr. 591, 595 (D. Minn. 1983), aff'd 741 F.2d
1112 (8th Cir. 1984)); In re Warren, 91 Bankr. 930, 931 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988) (not a
judicial lien within the meaning of section 522(f)(1)); In re Erwin, 25 Bankr. 363, 366
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (finds equitable mortgage because lien is security for payment of
money). But see Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1115 (Ross, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for
finding non-debtor husband's interest a mortgage because no consent by parties).
140. See, e.g., Wicks v. Wicks (In re Wicks), 26 Bankr. 769, 770-71 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1982) (lien is a security interest and is not avoidable), aff'd, Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d
1112 (8th Cir. 1984); Cowan v. Cowan (In re Scott), 12 Bankr. 613, 617 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1981) (" 'consensual and voluntary although judicially sanctioned' ") (quoting In re
Dunn, 10 Bankr. 385, 387 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981)); In re Shands, 57 Bankr. 49, 51
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1985) (spouse's lien was an unavoidable security interest); In re Stone, 119
Bankr. 222, 236 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1990) (property settlement agreement, note and
deed of trust created unavoidable security interest even if judicial lien is avoidable; court
denied lien avoidance). But see In re Showinsky 117 Bankr. 284, 287 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1990) (lien avoided despite uncontested divorce and settlement agreement).
141. See, e.g., In re Worth, 100 Bankr. 834, 840 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989) (purchase-
money obligation under Texas law); In re Stone, 119 Bankr. 222, 236 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.
1990) ("The agreed dissolution decree creates a security interest in the residence"); Boyd
v. Boyd (In re Boyd), 93 Bankr. 538, 539 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988) ("An equitable lien
awarded in a divorce decree ... will support a finding of an implied vendor's lien [as] a
valid lien upon a homestead.").
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source from which the debt is to be paid.'4 2 The equitable lien, which is
distinct from the judicial lien arising from the money judgment, is
unavoidable. 14a
The approach to the lien avoidance problem that focuses on the intent
of the divorce property law comprises a variety of theories, but all lead to
the conclusion that section 522(f)(1) is inapplicable to divorce decree
homestead liens."4 It is consistent with this approach to reject a "mech-
anistic construction" of the language of the statute 45 and to find that the
dischargeability of the debt is not a factor in the lien avoidance analy-
sis. 4 Decisions denying lien avoidance find additional support in equita-
142. See Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue, 862 F.2d 259, 266 (10th Cir. 1988). The
court determined that the non-debtor's unrecorded lien was a secured equitable lien. See
i& The court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court on the avoidance issue, noting
in dictum that granting avoidance would create unjust enrichment and that equitable
liens imposed by federal bankruptcy courts are arguably outside the scope of judicial
liens. See id. at 266, 266-67 n.ll. On remand, the lien was avoided, without discussion.
See Donahue v. Parker (In re Donahue), 110 Bankr. 41, 43 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1990); see
also Bailey v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 20 Bankr. 906, 912 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (una-
voidable equitable lien, even though lien not on specific property, based on divorce
court's equitable division of assets). But see Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899
F.2d 598, 604-05 (7th Cir.) ("whether liens of the type at issue in this case [a contested
divorce] are called equitable liens or vendor's liens or security interests, they still are
'judicial liens' " within the Code's definition), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-
350); Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 1984) (Ross, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that lien could not be a judicial lien because whether it attached to a specific piece of
property is "irrelevant, since the Bankruptcy Code does not require that a judicial lien
attach to all of the debtor's property").
There are pre-Code cases that recognized divorce property obligations as equitable
liens that survived bankruptcy. See, eg., Caldwell v. Armstrong, 342 F.2d 485, 490 (10th
Cir. 1965) (non-debtor spouse had equitable lien against life insurance policy owned by
debtor; policy was the fund out of which divorce monetary judgment was intended to be
paid); Thumm v. Thumm, (In re Thumm), 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1347, 1350 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1976) (divorced wife entitled to equitable lien over husband's homestead prop-
erty because the property was the source of payment, even though debt was
dischargeable).
143. See Donahue, 862 F.2d at 265-66; Borman v. Leiker (In re Borman), 886 F.2d
273, 274 (10th Cir. 1989); Hart v. Hart (In re Hart), 50 Bankr. 956, 961 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1985) (unavoidable equitable lien).
Avoiding a judicial lien under section 522(f)(1) "does not extinguish a valid security
interest.., upon which the lien is based." 1 W. Norton, Norton Bankruptcy Law and
Practice § 26.41, at 32 (1981). Where courts find a valid underlying lien, avoidance
under section 522(f)(1) has generally been denied. See Donahue, 862 F.2d at 265, 266-67
n.ll; Stone, 119 Bankr. at 238.
144. See supra notes 122-140 and accompanying text.
145. See Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("I would give the state court decree a far less mechanistic
construction. The division of property rights that Boyd envisions seems eminently sensi-
ble to me.").
146. See, e.g., Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259, 262 (10th Cir. 1988)
(central issue is whether obligation is simply an unsecured debt from a property settle-
ment or a secured debt not dischargeable in bankruptcy); Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d
1112, 1112-15 (8th Cir. 1984) (does not mention section 523(a)(5) or dischargeability of
the property settlement debt); see also Williams v. Williams (In re Williams), 38 Bankr.
224, 225-28 (Bankr. N.D.Okla. 1984) (dischargeability and avoidance examined sepa-
1990]
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ble factors relating largely to fairness to the non-debtor spouse 47 and to
unjust enrichment for the debtor spouse. 4 '
C. Section 522"(f)(1) Should Shelter Divorce Decree Homestead Liens
From Avoidance By The Debtor
The lien avoidance statute gives the greatest support to the debtor's
fresh start when the divorce decree is construed to provide for a sequen-
tial transfer of interests, which, occurring in a judicial proceeding, meets
the requirements of section 522(f)(1) as long as the debtor's exemption
allowance is impaired.'49 An alternative way to view the language of the
provision, however, is to focus on three essential factors: the purpose of
the divorce decree, the interest of the non-debtor spouse derived from
shared marital property, and the timing of the transaction. These funda-
mental elements of the property division lien lead to the conclusion that
the lien fails to attach to the debtor's interest and that the debtor does
not have the interest before the lien is fixed.' 50 The lien is therefore
outside the scope of the debtor's lien avoidance powers.",'
Although the language of section 522(f)(1) arguably supports either
analysis, the reading that protects divorce decree homestead liens from
avoidance by the debtor is the better approach because it is consistent
with both the words of the statute'52 and the intent of a divorce de-
cree. 1 53 Nor does this result "deform"'' 54 the Bankruptcy Code by de-
feating the fresh-start goal for the debtor, because the debtor is relieved
of personal liability for the dischargeable debt. 5 In addition, a
"straightforward distinction" between a judicial lien on the debtor's
property and one intended to secure a spouse's interest in the marital
property applies fairly to all divorces, contested and uncontested, on a
uniform basis.'5 6
Furthermore, denying debtors the right to avoid divorce-generated
homestead liens through statutory construction of section 522(f)(1) is
consistent with traditional federal deference to important state policies' 7
where, as here, other essential factors are also present: this interpretation
rately). For approaches to the relationship between dischargeability and avoidance, see
supra note 120 and accompanying text; infra notes 191-193 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 207-208, 211 and accompanying text.
148. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
149. See supra Part IIA and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 122-133 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 130-141 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 142-143 and
accompanying text (on equitable liens).
152. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
153. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
154. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 607 (7th Cir.) (Posner,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350).
155. See infra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
156. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 607 (Posner, J., dissenting).
157. See infra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
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does not contravene express Congressional policy,' it supports a para-
mount state interest in implementing domestic relations law,' 59 and it
does not unreasonably diminish the federal interest in the debtor's fresh
start.'" Such an analytical framework, which has not been sufficiently
articulated in the divorce decree homestead lien avoidance case law,
gains greater force from the equitable considerations that are inherent in
the conflict that section 522(f)(1) has instigated 6' between the legitimate
goals of both bankruptcy and divorce.
III. DIVORCE DECREE HOMESTEAD LIEN AVOIDANCE DISTURBS A
PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE
INTERESTS
A. The Legislative History of Section 522(f)(1) Calls for Excluding
Divorce Decree Homestead Liens
When faced with the "opposing interests"'' 62 implicated in the divorce
homestead lien avoidance issue, courts have turned to section 522(f)(1)
for guidance. Unfortunately, the language of this provision is unclear
and has thus engendered a conflict over its meaning.1 63 Where a provi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Code is "'subject to interpretation,' "64 the
United States Supreme Court has indicated that it is proper to consider
legislative history.' 65
Although the revision of the bankruptcy law generated an extensive
written record, there is little legislative history of section 522(f)(1).'16
158. See infra notes 169-179, 191-195 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 36-50, 181, 197-200 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 205-207 and accompanying text.
161. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
162. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir.) (citing In re Worth, 100
Bankr. 834, 837 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 1989)), cert. granted, I11 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-
350).
163. See supra Parts IIA-B and accompanying text.
164. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 244 (1989) (quoting Kelly
v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986)); see also United States v. Security Industrial Bank,
459 U.S. 70, 82 n.12 (1982) (" 'When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as
used in the [bankruptcy] statute, is available, there certainly can be no "rule of law"
which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on "superficial examina-
tion." ' ") (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-
44 (1940)) (citation omitted). Although the Seventh Circuit majority did not find the
words of section 522(f)(1) unclear, Judge Posner in dissent stated that the result of the
Sanderfoot decision, permitting the divorce decree homestead lien to be avoided, was a
"product... of judicial misunderstanding." Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899
F.2d 598, 606 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No.
90-350).
165. See Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242.
166. See Parkinson, supra note 101, at 324. See generally Klee, Legislative History of
the New Bankruptcy Law, reprinted in [2 App. Legis. Hist.] Collier on Bankruptcy (15th
ed.), supra note 53, at xxv-xxvii (listing Bankruptcy Code legislative history materials and
suggesting order in which they should be consulted).
Although there is only slight authority in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act for the expanded
lien avoidance powers given to the debtor in the Code, see 1 W. Norton, Norton Bank-
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Section 522(f)(1) was not mentioned in the floor statements in either the
House or Senate upon final passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 6 '
Moreover, although the House and Senate committee reports com-
mented on section 522(f)(1), they merely stated that the debtor's exemp-
tions, his discharge and thus his fresh start are protected by permitting
him to avoid certain liens on exempt property. 68
The introductory pages of the House Report, however, contain one
passage that is more instructive. Referring to section 522(f)(1), it ex-
plains that
The debtor may void any judicial lien on exempt property . [This]
... right allows the debtor to undo the actions of creditors that bring
legal action against the debtor shortly before bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
exists to provide relief for an overburdened debtor. If a creditor beats
the debtor into court, the debtor is nevertheless entitled to his
exemptions. 169
ruptcy Law and Practice § 26.39, at 31 (1981), debtors were given limited rights to avoid
liens on exempt property in the Bankruptcy Act. See 30 Stat. 544, as amended 52 Stat.
840, 875-76 § 67a (1)(4) (1938) (repealed 1978); see also Geo. A. Clark & Son, Inc. v.
Nold, 85 S.D. 468, 472, 185 N.W.2d 677, 679 ("As to property set aside as exempt it is
for the bankrupt to avoid the lien."), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971).
The exemption concept found in section 522(f)(1) originated in the Bankruptcy Act of
1867, when for the first time liens created by a legal proceeding were permitted tQ be
invalidated in bankruptcy. See J. Moore & L. King, 4 Collier on Bankruptcy § 67.01, at
18 (14th ed. 1978) [hereinafter Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed.)]. This right was ex-
panded, in turn, by section 67 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, and by section 67a(I) of the
Bankruptcy Act as it was amended in 1938. See id. § 67.02, at 20, 48. The purpose of
lien avoidance had long been to negate efforts by "diligent" creditors to secure antecedent
debts on exempt property before the debtor declared bankruptcy, thereby gaining prefer-
ential treatment over unsecured creditors. See id. § 67.01, at 17-18.
Under the Bankruptcy Act prior to 1978, the debtor, independently of the trustee,
could invalidate "any lien" against the bankrupt's exempt property "obtained by attach-
ment, judgment, levy, or other legal or equitable process or proceedings" within the four-
month period before the debtor filed for bankruptcy. 30 Stat. 544, as amended 52 Stat.
840, 875-76 (1938) (repealed 1978); see 4 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed.), supra,
§ 67.15[2], at 169-72. In addition, the debtor had to be insolvent at the time the lien
attached to receive the protections of section 67a. See 30 Stat. 544, as amended 52 Stat.
840, 876 (1938) (repealed 1978). Furthermore, a debtor was barred from avoiding liens
where he had signed a waiver of exemption. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed.),
supra, § 67.15[2], at 169 n.14.
The avoidance powers granted the debtor in section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code
removed many of the conditions barring debtor suits against lienholders under the former
Act. Section 522(f) requires neither insolvency nor a time limitation before the debtor
files a petition for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988). Furthermore, a waiver of
exemption is ineffective. See id. ("Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, .... ").
167. See Final House Debate, 124 Cong. Rec. Hl1,866 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Don Edward), reprinted in [3 App. Legis. Hist.] Collier on Bankruptcy
(15th ed.), supra note 53, at X5-6; Senate Debate on Compromise Bill, 124 Cong. Rec.
S17,403-34 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in id. at X9-69.
168. See House Report, supra note 15, at 362, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5963, 6318; S. Rep. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1978) (under subsection
(e)), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5862.
169. See House Report, supra note 15, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5963, 6087-88.
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This passage indicates a legislative intent to "thwart unsecured creditors
who, sensing impending bankruptcy, rush into court to obtain liens on
exempt property, thus frustrating the purpose of the exemptions."'17 0
Such a scenario is distinguishable from that of an ex-spouse receiving a
lien in the divorce setting, where the purpose is not to defeat the debtor's
homestead exemption'71 but to resolve the breakdown of a marital rela-
tionship and divide marital assets,' 72 with each party receiving a recipro-
cal benefit. 173
Comments and testimony in the House and Senate committee hearings
and reports on ways to protect the debtor's exempt property related pri-
marily to consumer creditor abuses under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 174
particularly techniques that predatory creditors' imposed on debtors to
protect unsecured debts, such as agreements to waive exemptions 76 and
"blanket" security agreements on all of the debtor's household goods.'
170. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 606 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350); see also Parker v. Donahue
(In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259, 267 n. I (10th Cir. 1988) ("The award of a lien to secure
a property settlement in a divorce decree hardly approximates [this] situation ....");
Williams v. Williams (In re Williams), 38 Bankr. 224, 227 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1984) (the
"perceived evil" Congress set out to remedy was that wary creditors would leave the
debtor with no unencumbered property, but this does not even "remotely resemble" di-
vorce situation); In re Thomas, 32 Bankr. 11, 12 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) ("The relationship
of the parties in a dissolution proceeding is not a debtor/creditor relationship as is the
case at the time other lien interests are created. This distinction is crucial.").
171. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 606 (Posner, J., dissenting); see also supra note 170
(supporting view that legislative intent of section 522(f)(1) was to thwart over-zealous
creditors).
172. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
173. One commentator has distinguished the judicial lien creditor from most other
secured creditors on "purely economic grounds .... The judicial lien creditor... does
not provide any... reciprocal benefit to the debtor when taking her lien." Cross, supra
note 19, at 315 n.32. A judicial lien is generally perceived as one likely to arise from a
tort, a breach of sales contract, or a consumer loan. See id. at 315.
174. See, e.g., II Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives on H.R. 31
and H.R. 32, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 939-40 (1975) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act Revision.
House Hearings] (statement of Ernest Sarason, Staff Attorney, National Consumer Law
Center); see also I Commission Report 169, 173, 180 n.35, reprinted in [2 App. Legis.
Hist.] Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.), supra note 53, at 1-1-169, 173, 180, n.35 (on
waivers of exemption and security agreements); II Commission Report 130, reprinted in [2
App. Legis. Hist.] Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed.), supra note 53, at 1-11-130 (same);
Cross, supra note 19, at 311-15 (legislative history of section 522(f)).
175. See Cross, supra note 19, at 315.
176. Congress made waivers of exemption ineffective in section 522(f), which begins,
"Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions," and in section 522(e). See II U.S.C.
§§ 522(e)-(f) (1988).
177. See House Report, supra note 15, at 128 (describing how creditors used security
agreements as leverage for reaffirmation of debts), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5963, 6088-89. Subsection (f)(2) of section 522 was added to reduce the
impact of creditor use of such agreements on exempt household property. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(f)(2) (1988); see also Mordy, Dunn, & Johnson, Constitutionality of'Opt-Out'Stat-
utes Providing for Exemptions to Bankrupts, 48 Mo. L. Rev. 627, 646 (1983) (commenting
on legislative history of the lien avoidance provision); Parkinson, supra note 101, at 324-
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Discussions and statements relating to creditors and exempt property
were generally concerned with consumer debt, not divorce.178 Further-
more, the legislative history of the Code dealt with property divisions in
the context of debt dischargeability, not lien avoidance. 79 In short,
while the relevant legislative history of section 522(f)(1) is not conclu-
sive, it does suggest that Congress was contemplating something other
than state judgments embodied in divorce-decree homestead liens.
B. Lien Avoidance Unreasonably Burdens States' Implementation of
Divorce Judgments
The legislative history of section 522(f)(1) does not preclude the exclu-
sion of divorce decree homestead liens from the debtor's avoidance
power.18° This position is further supported by comparison of the his-
tory and language of the lien avoidance provision with the traditional
relationship between federal and state law in the domestic relations area.
Nullification of divorce decree homestead liens creates a conflict between
the federal interest in the debtor's fresh start and the states' interest in
protecting the enforceability of divorce court decisions. 181 When state
family law comes into conflict with a federal statute, the Supreme Court
has noted that the standard for its determination is whether Congress has
"'positively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-
empted." '182 The Supreme Court has "consistently recognized that Con-
gress, when it passes general legislation, rarely intends to displace state
authority in [the domestic relations] area."' 83 The question, then, is
whether Congress has "positively required by direct enactment" 184 that
section 522(f)(1)'s lien avoidance provision override state marital prop-
erty divisions.
In contrast to section 522(f)(1), section 523(a)(5) directly addresses
divorce property division debts. 85 Congressional intent is clearly ex-
25 (same); Note, Avoiding Liens Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 15 U. Mich. J. L.Ref.
577, 579-82 (1982) (same).
178. See supra notes 174 and 177.
179. See, e.g., III Bankruptcy Act Revision, House Hearings, supra note 174, at 1288-90
(testimony of Bankruptcy Judge Joe Lee) (discussing dischargeability of divorce property
division debts).
180. See supra notes 166-179 and accompanying text.
181. See In re McCormmach, 111 Bankr. 330, 331 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990); see also Brief
for Petitioner at 32-36, Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
182. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting Wetmore v.
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)). Domestic relations have long been acknowledged as
preeminently a matter of state law. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989); see
also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) ("statutory regulation of domestic relations
[is] an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States").
183. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 587.
184. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581 (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
185. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988) (applies to liens; divorce-related property
not mentioned) with id. at § 523(a)(5) (applies to debts; specifically addresses divorce
obligations).
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pressed in section 523(a)(5) that property divisions that are essentially
economic settlements distributing financial assets, and therefore not
designed to meet family support obligations, are to be dischargeable. 8 6
Section 523(a)(5)(B) also authorizes federal courts to examine terms used
in the decree such as "alimony" or "property settlement" when making a
determination of what is "actually" support.'" 7
Both the language of section 523(a)(5) and its legislative history ex-
pressly provide that federal bankruptcy law standards can preempt state
law and state court judgments in determining whether property settle-
ment debts are dischargeable or non-dischargeable. 88 By requiring that
alimony, maintenance and child support remain non-dischargeable, sec-
tion 523(a)(5) clearly recognizes the general principle that debtors cannot
ignore their family obligations8 9 while simultaneously indicating that
the debtor's fresh start should be protected to the extent that property
186. See id § 523(a)(5) (1988).
187. See id. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1988); see also House Report, supra note 15, at 364 (com-
ment on section 523(a)(5)), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963,
6319; S. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (under paragraph (6)) (1978) (same),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5865; infra note 188 (discus-
sion of how courts make determinations of dischargeability under § 523(a)(5)).
188. See House Report, supra note 15, at 364 ("What constitutes alimony, mainte-
nance, or support will be determined under the Bankruptcy laws, not State law"), re-
printed in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6320; S. Rep. No. 595, 95th
Cong. 2d Sess. 79 (1978) (under paragragh (6)) (same), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 5787, 5865; G. Treister, supra note 11, § 7.08(e), at 321, 323. Many
bankruptcy courts look beyond labels characterizing the divorce awards as "alimony" or
"property settlement" to determine the intent of the parties, while others hold that state
law controls. See Coffman v. Coffman (In re Coffman), 52 Bankr. 667, 674-75 and n.6
(Bankr. D. Md. 1985); 2 H. Clark, supra note 5, § 16.2, at 183.
The Bankruptcy Code "does not define 'alimony, maintenance, or support.'" See
Coffman, 52 Bankr. at 670. The absence of a uniform federal standard for distinguishing
between property divisions that are intended to be support obligations from those that are
not has led to a great deal of litigation under section 523(a)(5). See Gold, The Dis-
chargeability of Divorce Obligations Under the Bankruptcy Code: Five Faulty Premises in'
the Application of Section 523(a)(5), 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 455, 460-61, 498 (1988-89);
see also Coffman, 52 Bankr. at 671, 674 n.6 (summarizing different factors used in federal
jurisdictions in making dischargeability determinations). Commentators have criticized
the tests used by courts in Section 523(a)(5) dischargeability determinations for fre-
quently failing to meet the needs of both spouses. See, e.g., Gold, supra, at 456 (court
should consider needs and incomes of both spouses as they exist at time of section
523(a)(5) trial, not when divorce decree was awarded); Scheible, supra note 31, at 7, 60-
61 (suggesting a standard for distinguishing between support and non-support property
divisions that is more responsive to the needs of non-debtor spouses); Comment, Striking
the Mean Between the Goals of Bankruptcy and Divorce: Developing a Standard for the
Classification of Domestic Obligations Under Section 523(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Code, 7
Bankr. Dev. J. 565, 593-94 (1990) (lack of a uniform federal standard needs to be reme-
died on basis of "reasonableness"); see also H.R. 1242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1991 (bill to
make property settlement debts non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(5) introduced by
Rep. H. Hyde and referred to the Judiciary Comm.).
189. See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904); see also III Bankruptcy Act Revi-
sion, House Hearings, supra note 174, at 1288-90 (testimony of Bankruptcy Judge Joe
Lee) (on dischargeability policy under section 523(a)(5)); Vukowich, supra note 19, at
797 ("basic goal" of section 523(a)(5) is to protect debtors' families).
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division debts are distinguishable from family obligations. 9 '
Because the Code clearly favors discharging the type of divorce-related
property settlement debts at issue in the lien avoidance problem, one ar-
gument for upholding the debtor's lien avoidance right is that freeing the
debtor's exempt property of such an encumbrance "harmonizes different
Code sections."1 91 But this reasoning is not mandated by the words of
either section 522(f)(1) or section 523(a)(5); 19 2 rather, there is a strong
argument that the policy of Congress towards unsecured property divi-
sion debts expressed in section 523(a)(5) does not apply to the lien avoid-
ance inquiry under section 522(f)(1).193 In contrast to section 523(a)(5),
neither the language nor the legislative history of section 522(f)(1) indi-
cates that Congress " 'positively required by direct enactment' "19 that
the lien avoidance provision embody any specific policy toward property
divisions in divorce. 19
5
190. Property settlements were generally not exceptions to discharge under § 35(a)(7)
of the Bankruptcy Act. See Note, Bankruptcy and Divorce in Kansas, 29 Washburn L.J.
551, 558 n.39 (1990). Efforts by the Commission to make property settlements non-dis-
chargeable were rebuffed by Congress in section 523(a)(5). See III Bankruptcy Act Revi-
sion, House Hearings, supra note 174, at 1288-90 (testimony of Bankruptcy Judge Joe
Lee); see generally Note, Congressional Intent in Excepting Alimony, Maintenance, and
Support from Discharge in Bankruptcy, 21 J. Fam. L. 525, 525-42 (1982-83) (background
and legislative history of section 523(a)(5)).
191. Pederson v. Stedman (In re Pederson), 78 Bankr. 264, 267 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987),
aff'd sub nom. Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989); see
also Coffman, 52 Bankr. 667, 676 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985) (debt found dischargeable; lien
voided without discussion); Pederson, 875 F.2d at 784 (avoiding lien consistent with con-
gressional policy "'that property settlements should be treated the same as other debts in
bankruptcy'" (quoting Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 1984) (Ross, J.,
dissenting)).
192. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(f)(1), 523(a)(5) (1988).
193. See supra notes 91-92, 146 and accompanying text. By implication, these courts
do not perceive a conflict between section 522(f)(1) and section 523(a)(5) when a lien
supporting a dischargeable debt is not avoided. In treating dischargeability and avoid-
ance as separate issues, these judges add additional support to interpreting section
522(f)(1) as excluding divorce decree liens from the debtor's lien avoidance powers. One
basis for upholding an interpretation of Code language is that the interpretation does not
conflict with another Code section. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 242-43 (1989).
194. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting Wetmore v. Markoc,
196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)).
195. See Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("it is difficult to see how reaching [the] conclusion [that the
lien should not be avoided] does violence to any 'policy judgment made by the political
branches of government' ").
Examination of the distinction between procedures assigned in the Code for the dis-
chargeability of property settlement debts and for lien avoidance also suggests that Con-
gress may not have contemplated that family law matters would fall within the scope of
section 522(f)(1). Section 523(a)(5) debts can only be discharged after an adversarial
proceeding initiated by a complaint. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(a), 4007(e), and 7001(6)
(1990); 1 A. Herzog & L. King, Bankruptcy Code 321 (Collier pamphlet ed. 1990/91).
By contrast, proceedings to avoid liens on exempt property under section 522(f)(1) are
contested hearings requiring only that the debtor file a motion. See 8 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy, Bankruptcy Rules, § 4003.06 (15th ed. 1987). The contested hearing for deter-
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Absent strong evidence that Congress intended to invade the states'
traditionally preeminent role in domestic relations, 96 lien avoidance
places an unreasonable burden on state divorce courts in fulfilling their
statutory duty to make fair property divisions based upon case-specific
factors. 197 Lien avoidance allows the debtor to frustrate'98 the divorce
court's dual goals of fairly apportioning the net assets of the marriage
and protecting that division where there is formerly shared property to
which the debt can be secured. 9 9 Lien avoidance also hampers the abil-
ity of divorce courts to enforce their decisions, because without the use of
homestead liens, state courts are left without a viable means for dividing
property that can withstand a debtor's challenge under the Code."°°
mining the validity of a lien is an exception to the general Code rule requiring adversary
proceedings. See id. It "is a recognition that ... the vast majority of cases brought under
section 522(f)... [are] not contested, and that even where there is a contest the issue is
usually a relatively simple question of valuation." Id.
Congress was aware of the frequent association of bankruptcy with divorce. See I
Commission Report 42, reprinted in [2 App. Legis. Hist.] Collier on Bankruptcy (15th
ed.), supra note 53, at 1-1-42. In addition to section 523(a)(5), Congress also directly
addressed divorce property settlements in section 541(a)(5)(B), which includes in the
debtor's estate property from a divorce settlement that the debtor acquires or becomes
entitled to within 180 days after filing for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(B)
(1988).
196. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
197. See 2 H. Clark, supra note 5, § 16.1, at 176-77; supra note 42.
198. On avoidance, see supra note 19; on dischargeability, see supra note 57 and ac-
companying text.
199. See Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 1984) (enforcing lien is
substantively grounded in state family law because it offers protection for the contribu-
tions each spouse makes to the marriage as reflected in the division of marital assets).
The Boyd court also felt that its interpretation of Minnesota law was neither "a subter-
fuge to avoid the effect of § 522(f) [n]or would [it] license a state to establish property
doctrines that would circumvent this section." Id
200. See, e.g., In re McCormmach, 111 Bankr. 330, 331 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990) ("The
state courts must have some means of dividing property without running afoul of
§ 522(f).") rev'd, No. OR-90-1341 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991); Brief for Petitioner at 36-38,
Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
507 (1990) (No. 90-350) (liens are "well-established, practical and effective tool[s] for
dividing marital property"). Other alternatives for the courts in contested divorces fail to
meet either the requirements of section 522(f)(1) or the goals of modem divorce law
policy. See Brief for Petitioner at 37, Sanderfoot (No. 90-350). A divorce court require-
ment that debtor spouses take a mortgage, for example, is unlikely to survive scrutiny as a
"security interest" under section 522(f)(1), since the debtor would be acting under court
order. See id. at 37 (citing Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 604 n. 17). Ordering immediate sale of
the homestead property would result in forcing families from their homes and would
"destroy... the very rationale for a homestead exemption." Id. at 37; see also Boyd v.
Robinson, 31 Bankr. 591, 959 (D. Minn. 1983) ("method of a lien was chosen to avoid a
forced sale of the property"), aff'd 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). Stipulating that non-
debtor spouses have an ownership interest in the homestead property until that interest is
paid conflicts with divorce law goals of finality and a fresh start for both spouses, particu-
larly if financial contributions to the maintenance of the property are required. See Brief
for Petitioner at 37, Sanderfoot (No. 90-350); see also R. Aaron, supra note 3, § 7.01[3] at
7-12.4-5 (on limited methods practitioners can use to protect non-debtor spouses).
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C. Debtor Nullification of Divorce Decrees Undermines the
Bankruptcy Code as a Branch of Equity2"'
Equitable application of the bankruptcy laws in the divorce setting
goes beyond policy considerations embedded in state family law,20 2 im-
plicating most significantly issues of fairness and "simple justice" 2 3 for
the non-debtor spouse. The exclusion of divorce decree homestead liens
from the operation of section 522(f)(1) would admittedly reduce the
fresh start available to a debtor spouse through the homestead exemp-
tion. Bankruptcy and divorce are both "radical legal remedies for crisis
situations,"" ° however, and the interests of both spouses require protec-
tion. If section 522(f)(1) is closed off, section 523(a)(5) still protects the
debtor by relieving him or her of personal liability for the property settle-
ment debt.205 Moreover, even when homestead liens on property divi-
sions are not avoided, the workings of other Code provisions may benefit
the debtor by reducing the amount recoverable by the ex-spouse. 20 6 If
the former marital home cannot support any portion of the divorce-de-
cree lien, however, the non-debtor spouse may well be left empty-
handed.07
Lien avoidance enables the debtor to retain what is usually the mar-
riage's most substantial asset while depriving the non-debtor spouse of a
rightful share in that asset.208 As one court commented, lien avoidance
201. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 607 (7th Cir.) (Posner,
J., dissenting) (bankruptcy a "branch... of equity"), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990)
(No. 90-350).
202. See supra notes 36-45, 181, 197-200 and accompanying text.
203. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 607; see also R. Aaron, supra note 2, § 7.01[3,1 at 7-12.1
("The idea that the debtor may shed a lien imposed to protect the nondebtor spouse
seems offensive.").
204. See Staggs, Bankruptcy After Divorce: Rights and Liabilities of Former Spouses in
Texas, 23 S. Tex. L.J. 173, 173 (1982).
205. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
206. In Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), on remand, 110 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1990), for example, the debtor sought to determine the amount of the lien, held by
the court to be an unavoidable lien under section 522(f)(1), that was nonetheless avoida-
ble as undersecured under section 506. See id. at 44. The Kansas bankruptcy court
adopted the majority view of section 506(a) that debtors in Chapter 7 bankruptcies can
use section 506(a) and voided nearly $12,000 of the non-debtor's valid claim of approxi-
mately $48,000. See id. at 45.
207. See supra notes 19, 24, and 71 and accompanying text. The resulting loss to the
non-debtor spouse is particularly troublesome because section 522(f)(1) does require in-
quiry into the current circumstances of the non-debtor spouse. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)
(1988). The Tenth Circuit used its equitable powers to impose a non-avoidable equitable
lien on the basis of hardship to the non-debtor wife in Borman v. Leiker (In re Borman),
886 F.2d 273, 274 (10th Cir. 1989). Some courts granting lien avoidance acknowledged
that the results may be harsh but expressed the view that Congress, not the courts, should
address policy issues. See supra note 121 and infra note 212 and accompanying text.
208. See Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259, 265 (10th Cir. 1988); see
also Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 606 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (non-debtor wife's interest equal to debtor's under state laws "whether or not
her name appeared on the title papers"), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350);
see also In re Thomas, 32 Bankr. 11, 13 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (lien avoidance "would
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"seriously thwart[s] the intended effect" of a divorce decree. 20 Under
these circumstances, debtors are unjustly enriched. 210 Furthermore, sec-
tion 522(f)(1) makes no provision for inquiring into the hardship of the
non-debtor spouse.21I Even those courts that view avoiding divorce de-
cree homestead liens as consistent with congressional policy have none-
theless recognized that avoidance can lead to harsh results and have
suggested that "[p]erhaps Congress should reexamine the statute."72t 2
The federal interest in legitimate use of the bankruptcy laws is also
implicated when disgruntled spouses213 are able to use the lien avoidance
provision to nullify their divorce decrees; the Bankruptcy Code is re-
duced to a "tool by which bounders defraud their spouses.- 214 As Judge
Richard Posner has stated, a tactic that allows the debtor to get "a fresh
start with someone else's property'215 is a "perversion of the bankruptcy
law."2 16
Removal of divorce decree homestead liens from the operation of sec-
tion 522(f)(1) would apply to debtors regardless of whether they choose
the federal exemption scheme or their state homestead law.2t7 It would
also eliminate the possibility of differential treatment of liens arising in
contested and uncontested divorces under federal law."1 8 The Bank-
ruptcy Code must continue to offer the debtor meaningful opportunities
for emerging from bankruptcy with a fresh start, but it should not un-
fairly penalize the non-debtor spouse.219 With nearly 1.2 million di-
allow debtor to keep property or its proceeds which belongs to another person") (citing
In re Maness, 17 Bankr. 76, 77 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)).
209. Thomas, 32 Bankr. at 12-13.
210. See Borman v. Leiker (In re Borman), 886 F.2d 273, 274 (10th Cir. 1989); Dona-
hue, 862 F.2d at 265.
211. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
212. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir.), cert granted, Ill S. Ct. 507
(1990) (No. 90-350); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text (on judicial deference
to Congress in interpreting section 522(f)(1)). Even under the circumstances of Maus v.
Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988), where the divorce decree lien was not placed on the
homestead and the court therefore avoided the lien, the Tenth Circuit suggested that lien
avoidance in the divorce setting "may produce questionable results in some circum-
stances"-even where the lien was not specific to the marital property. See id. at 940.
213. According to Ms. Farrey, the non-debtor spouse in Sanderfoor, her husband "told
me when I left him that if I divorced him he'd see to it that I got nothing, that he was
going to file for bankruptcy." Margolick, supra note 96, at 9, col. 3.
214. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 606 (Posner, J., dissenting). The debtor in Sanderfoot
filed a petition for bankruptcy shortly after the state divorce court rendered its judgment.
See id. But see Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Code provides ample tools for ferreting out abuses.").
215. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 606 (Posner, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 608.
217. See supra notes 65-69, 101 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
219. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 607-08 (7th Cir.) (Pos-
ner, J., dissenting) (avoidance of lien will give debtor husband all rather than half of
marital property, allowing husband to "steal from his former wife"), cert. granted, I I S.
Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-350); supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
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vorces granted annually22° and the number of personal bankruptcy filings
likely to continue rising,221 lien avoidance must be removed as a means
by which divorced debtors can use federal law unilaterally to modify se-
cured divorce property divisions. Bankruptcy law should promote poli-
cies that are fundamental to both divorce and bankruptcy: fairness and a
fresh start.
CONCLUSION
When applied to divorce decree liens on marital homestead property,
the right of debtors to avoid liens under section 522(f)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code upsets the complex interrelationship between federal bank-
ruptcy law and state divorce law. If property agreements incorporated
into divorce decrees cannot withstand the operation of section 522(f)(1),
the efforts of modern divorce reform to encourage peaceful resolution of
divorces will perpetually conflict with federal bankruptcy law. If court
judgments enforcing property divisions in contested divorces can be nul-
lified by section 522(f)(1), divorce courts will be severely handicapped in
implementing the mandates of state divorce statutes.
Section 522(f)(1) homestead lien avoidance involves property shared
in a marital relationship, not a typical debtor-creditor transaction. Most
importantly, federal law may deprive a non-debtor spouse of virtually all
of the remaining marital assets while giving the debtor property that the
divorce decree intended to distribute fairly to both spouses. The debtor's
fresh start is already protected by other provisions of the Code that re-
lieve the debtor of personal liability for property division debts. To
achieve a more proper balance between federal and state interests in the
bankruptcy-divorce setting and to ensure more equitable protection of
the fresh start goals of both debtor and ex-spouse, debtors should not be
permitted to use federal bankruptcy law to avoid divorce decree home-
stead liens.
Phyllis A. Klein
220. See supra note 96.
221. See id.; see also Marino, Business of Going Bankrupt is Booming, Chi. Trib., Dec.
3, 1989, Bus. at 22F ("stigma once associated with [bankruptcy] has diminished, largely
because the number of people swamped in debt has soared and changes in federal laws
have made bankruptcy filing easier").
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